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MID-ATLANTIC  ETHICS  COMMITTEE
N E W S L E T T E R
LESSONS FROM BEHAVIORAL 
ECONOMICS  
The Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee 
Newsletter is a publication of the 
Maryland Health Care Ethics 
Committee Network, an initiative of 
the University of Maryland Francis 
King Carey School of Law’s Law & 
Health Care Program. The Newsletter 
combines educational articles with 
timely information about bioethics 
activities. Each issue includes a feature 
article, a Calendar of upcoming 
events, and a case presentation and 
commentary by local experts in 
bioethics, law, medicine, nursing, or 
related disciplines.  
 
 Diane E. Hoffmann, JD, MS - Editor
Michael Lewis’ bestselling book “The Undoing Project” (2016) chronicles the 
friendship and partnership of Israeli psychologists Dan Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky, whose research on systematic errors in human judgment jump-started the 
field of behavioral economics. In the book, Lewis recounts the story of how internist 
Don Redelmeier took on the role of checking trauma specialists’ decisions for 
systematic mental errors known as “heuristic biases.” An example Lewis provides 
is a patient admitted to Redelmeier’s trauma center with multiple fractures from a 
motor vehicle accident. The patient developed a heart arrhythmia. Upon mentioning 
to her physicians that she had a history of hyperthyroidism, they concluded 
that this was causing her arrhythmia. Redelmeier encouraged the physicians to 
pause, check their thinking, and consider more statistically probable causes of the 
arrhythmia. Indeed, they discovered a collapsed lung, which hadn’t shown up on 
X-ray. The physicians’ failure to consider a collapsed lung is an example of the 
“representativeness heuristic” clouding the physicians’ judgment—that is, making 
a judgment based on resemblance of the situation to one fresh in the mind, without 
regard to statistical probabilities.  
Implications of Kahneman and Tversky’s research are relevant for the field 
of medicine, and in turn, for those responding to ethics consultation requests. 
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Just as the physicians Redelmeier 
interacted with fell prey to their error 
judgments, health care professionals 
in all disciplines and practice settings 
are prone to similar errors. The idea 
isn’t to defer to algorithms alone 
and mistrust all human judgments. 
Medicine and ethical decision-making 
are context-specific, and will always 
require experts to assemble and make 
meaning of relevant information. But 
Kahneman and Tversky’s research 
(and that of others in the field) 
demonstrates the benefits of pausing 
to consider ways in which known 
heuristic biases may influence the 
judgment of experts involved in a 
case. [See Box p. 3] Is treatment for 
the elderly patient in the intensive 
care unit truly non-beneficial, or could 
it be that the patient brings to mind 
others whose dying and suffering were 
prolonged unnecessarily? Simply 
pausing to consider that possibility 
could be helpful, and something an 
ethics consultation service could 
provide. As Redelmeier, cited by 
Lewis (2016), stated: “Wherever 
there is uncertainty there has got to 
be judgment … and wherever there is 
judgment there is an opportunity for 
human fallibility.”
How might this area of research 
influence clinicians’—and ethics 
consultants’—communication 
with patients and family members? 
Related research in the field of 
human decision-making and “choice 
architecture” has focused on the 
use of “nudges” that take advantage 
of cognitive biases to influence 
individuals’ decisions and actions 
(Ploug & Holm, 2015; Thaler & 
Sustein, 2008). Examples of some 
cognitive biases are listed in the Box 
on page 3. An example of a "nudge" 
to counteract a bias would be to frame 
the effects of an intervention the 
clinician recommends as a gain, and 
an intervention the clinician doesn't 
recommend as a loss (e.g., "95% of 
patients who were treated with [X] 
had no benefit, so I don't recommend 
it" or "25% of patients who were 
treated with [X] lived at least another 
five years, so that is something I'd 
recommend for you"). Some consider 
the use of nudges to be an effective 
tool of persuasion, allowing clinicians 
to fulfill duties of beneficence toward 
patients. Others wonder whether this 
crosses over into manipulation or even 
coercion (Blumenthal-Barby, 2016), 
perhaps causing clinicians to violate 
their duty to respect patient autonomy. 
Thus, this area is ripe for ethics 
committee members to appraise.
Anita J. Tarzian, PhD, RN
MHECN Program Coordinator
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HEURISTIC/BIAS DEFINITION/EXAMPLE
AFFECT Judgment is influenced by a feeling (affect) associated with a decision or action (e.g., patient 
rejects hospice due to its association with death)
AMBIGUITY AVERSION Preferring known risks over unknown risks regardless of actual benefits (e.g., hospital counsel 
favors a current ICU policy associated with known litigation rate over new policy expected to 
lower litigious actions but for which the actual impact on litigation is unknown)
ANCHORING Relying too heavily on the first piece of information offered (e.g., family told a patient’s 
condition is stable interpret future diagnostic information more favorably)
AVAILABILITY Giving more weight to recent or more easily recalled information (e.g., surrogate who had 
poor experience with staff more likely to appraise other staff’s behavior negatively)
BANDWAGON Favoring decisions or actions that are more popularly supported (e.g., concluding a 
controversial opinion is right because everyone else on the ethics committee has agreed)
COMMISSION Favoring action rather than inaction (e.g., internist orders diagnostic tests that won’t change 
the patient’s end-of-life care)
CONFIRMATION Gathering & filtering information to support one’s pre-existing beliefs (e.g., clinician 
assembles data only on poor outcomes of extremely low birthweight infants to support 
position to favor comfort care)  
DECOY Changing one’s preference between two options when a third “decoy” option is presented 
(e.g., reconsidering paying more for a better but costlier drug when a third more expensive 
drug is offered)
DEFAULT/STATUS QUO Preferring the current situation regardless of outcomes (e.g., family selects to keep dying 
patient in the ICU even though goals of treatment would be better achieved elsewhere)
FREQUENCY/FRAMING 
EFFECT
Preferring a decision or action presented as a gain over one presented as a loss (e.g. patients 
told they have a 5% chance of cure more likely to choose treatment than those told there’s a 
95% chance it will not work)
IMPACT Overestimating the long-term impact of positive and negative events (e.g., healthy individuals 
appraise future disability more negatively than those who are disabled)
LOSS/GAIN FRAMING Preferring avoiding loss rather than acquiring gains (e.g., those told inactivity will take 3 years 
off their lifespan are more likely to exercise than those told exercise will add 3 years to their 
lifespan)
OMISSION Judging harmful commissions as worse than corresponding omissions (e.g., parents view 
harms associated with vaccinating their child as worse than harm of foregoing vaccinations, 
despite data to contrary)
OPTIMISM Judging that one has a lesser risk of experiencing a negative event compared to others (e.g., 
parents who don’t vaccinate their child are confident this will not cause harm to the child or to 
others)
ORDER EFFECTS Choosing information presented at the beginning or end of a series more often than 
information presented in the middle of the series (e.g., patients order healthier foods from 
hospital menus when healthy choices come first)
OUTCOME Allowing a prior event or decision outcome to influence subsequent independent decisions 
(e.g., a clinician chooses a more expensive drug for a patient simply because a prior patient 
had a bad reaction to the generic version) 
RELATIVE RISK Being more likely to act when presented with the relative risk of something (e.g., inactive 
women are 25% more likely to develop breast cancer than women who exercise) than when 
presented with its absolute risk (e.g., 500 women per 100,000 who are inactive develop breast 
cancer annually)
REPRESENTATIVENESS Making a judgment based on resemblance of the situation to one fresh in the mind, instead 
of considering the laws of probability (e.g., assuming the delirious patient in the emergency 
department with a long history of alcoholism is intoxicated)
SUNK-COST Choosing to continue an undertaking because money, time, or effort has been invested (e.g., 
clinicians of a patient considered terminal after 3 months in the ICU continue life-prolonging 
interventions based on desire for efforts not to be wasted)
Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2008). Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
BOX 1.
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ANA UPDATES POSITION ON NUTRITION & HYDRATION 
AT END OF LIFE
The American 
Nurses 
Association’s 
(ANA) Center 
for Ethics and 
Human Rights 
has revised its 
position statement 
on Nutrition and 
Hydration at 
the End of Life 
(ANA, 2017). 
The new position 
recognizes 
the right of 
decisionally 
capable patients 
to voluntarily stop 
eating and drinking (VSED) as 
a means to hasten their death. 
Specifically, it states: “The 
decision to voluntarily stop eating 
and drinking … with the intention 
of hastening death can be made 
only by those patients with 
decision-making capacity, not by 
surrogates. A patient’s decision 
regarding VSED remains binding, 
even if the patient subsequently 
loses capacity.”
The ANA considers a nurse’s 
involvement in assisted suicide 
and euthanasia to constitute a 
violation of the nursing Code of 
Ethics (ANA, 2015). Specifically, 
the Code’s Provision 1, that the 
“nurse practices with compassion 
and respect for the inherent 
dignity, worth, and unique 
attributes of every person” (p. 
1) requires that nurses “should 
provide interventions to relieve 
pain and other symptoms in the 
dying patient consistent with 
palliative care practice standards 
and may not act with the sole 
intent to end life” (Provision 1.4 in 
the Code's Interpretive Statements, 
p. 3). Thus, the Code acknowledges 
that providing support and symptom 
management to the patient who 
chooses VSED to hasten his or her 
own death does not constitute acting 
“with the sole intent to end life,” but 
that participating in assisted suicide 
is a “direct violation” of the Code, 
“the ethical traditions and goals of 
the profession, and its covenant with 
society” (ANA, 2013). For states 
where assistance in dying is legal, 
such as Oregon (i.e., adults in those 
states deemed terminally ill can 
legally access a lethal prescription to 
hasten their death if they go through 
certain procedural steps), the ANA 
acknowledges ways nurses may stay 
involved, such as explaining state 
laws to patients, discussing options 
regarding end-of-life decisions with 
them, exploring reasons for the 
patient’s request to hasten his or her 
death, and following up accordingly.
VSED offers an option for legally 
hastening one’s death in states where 
access to a lethal 
prescription is not 
available. Schwarz 
(2017) explains 
that this route 
requires a person’s 
firm commitment 
to forego nutrition 
and hydration by 
mouth—a process 
that typically leads to 
death by dehydration 
generally within two 
weeks or longer if 
the person continues 
to ingest fluids. This 
approach to hastening 
death requires 
palliative support, including good 
oral hygiene, symptom management, 
and family support. For those worried 
about losing the capacity to choose 
VSED (e.g., individuals in the later 
stages of Alzheimer’s who continue 
accepting spoon feedings), Schwarz 
(2017) proposes specific language 
to include in an advance directive to 
allow caregivers to withhold spoon 
feeding, particularly if it appears 
“reflexive” and is not providing 
comfort or pleasure. The ANA’s 
revised position provides support for 
this position, although determining 
whether a person with dementia 
is “reflexively” eating may be 
challenging. 
REFERENCES
Schwarz, J. (2017). Hospice care for 
patients who choose to hasten death 
by voluntarily stopping eating and 
drinking. Southeast VSED End-of-
Life Choice conference. Available at 
https://vsed-2017.net/resources/. 
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Cont. on page 6
Back in the days of “doctor 
knows best,” empathy was of little 
value when deciding how to care 
for a patient. Why bother seriously 
considering what the patient might 
be going through since the doctor’s 
recommendation was the final word 
in patient care? The patient could 
either accept the recommendation or 
go elsewhere—making the question, 
“What is the patient experiencing?” 
unimportant. Today, however, both 
patients and medical professionals see 
empathy as an essential part of good 
clinical medicine. But, I have come 
to wonder if we clinical ethicists 
have an adequate understanding 
of empathy. It seems to be both an 
essential practice and a perplexing 
concept in need of clarity. 
When I began thinking about the 
role of empathy in medicine and 
clinical ethics, I began by looking 
at the word itself. Our English 
word “empathy” came from the 
German term Einfühlung—a word 
rooted in the Greek term empátheia. 
The German word began carrying 
philosophical and theological weight 
in Germany in the late nineteenth 
century. Theodor Lipps (1851–1914) 
was one of the first western thinkers 
to explore the psychological and 
philosophical aspects of Einfühlung. 
Lipps’ central concern is what has 
come to be known as the “problem of 
other minds.” Descartes inaugurated 
this problem by insisting that we 
could never have true knowledge of 
the existence of other minds without 
a guarantee from a benevolent 
creator. Descartes recognized that 
it certainly appeared other people 
had minds: thinking, talking, and 
writing. But without a guarantee 
from God, he could never be certain. 
Lipps accepted that this is a serious 
philosophical problem, and went 
about trying to argue for the existence 
of other minds based in the processes 
of Einfühlung. In 1909 Edward 
Titchener (1867–1927) translated 
Einfühlung as “empathy,” coining the 
English word. 
Contemporary clinical ethicists 
may not feel an intellectual kinship 
with nineteenth century German 
philosophers, but empathy is not so 
far from Einfühlung as one might 
think. Ethicists often try to discover 
the ideas that make up another 
person’s view of the world. The 
ethicist obviously cannot ask, “Could 
you tell me about the concepts that 
comprise your mental world?” Even 
if the ethicist would venture to ask 
such an awkward question, the 
ethicist’s tasks require more than an 
inventory of a patient’s beliefs. True, 
the ethicist often attempts to excavate 
and understand the beliefs of the 
patient or medical professional, but 
more than this, the ethicist hopes to 
discover how an individual’s beliefs 
inform her ideas about good medicine 
and proper action. 
More recently, philosophers, 
psychologists, and neuroscientists 
have become interested in the 
possibility that empathy plays a 
significant role in understanding not 
only the existence of other minds 
(Descartes’ problem), but the ways 
other minds function in constructing 
our own ideas of who we are. We 
see this in questions such as: What 
is this person going through? What 
ideas are found in the mind of the 
other person? How should I respond 
to them? What does their world say 
about my world? 
Empathy, as I envision it, begins 
with humility. The ethicist must 
be willing to set aside her own 
conception of what exists and what is 
right, temporarily, to try to imagine 
the worldview of the patient. This 
requires setting aside one’s own 
views about wellbeing, suffering, and 
proper medical care. For example, 
EMPATHY: IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE
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consider a family member who rejects 
the concept of death by neurological 
criteria (a.k.a. “brain death”). The 
ethicist may believe that this stance 
is conceptually problematic, but—
at this point—the ethicist’s goals 
involve understanding and relating 
to the person who accepts it, not 
correcting another’s idea of death. 
As part of being an empathetic 
presence, the ethicist should aim to 
understand the patient’s physical, 
psychological, and social-familial 
circumstances. One way of beginning 
this kind of conversation is by 
listening for activities that the patient 
finds important and putting these 
activities in the context of daily life. 
For example, saying something like, 
“It sounds like going to temple has 
been very important for you. What 
other activities do you do most 
weeks?” Listening for the actions 
the patient considers important will 
provide a sense of where she finds 
value and meaning in life. 
The ethicist might also ask, when 
appropriate, “Could you take me 
through what an average day looked 
like for you, before you entered the 
hospital?” If the patient has been 
declining due to illness over time, 
the ethicist might ask, “Have you 
had any trouble doing these activities 
since you started getting sick?” 
These activities may involve physical 
activities (e.g., hiking a local trail), 
mental exertion (e.g., reading or 
doing crossword puzzles), and social 
interaction (e.g., spending time with 
family). Answers to this question 
will begin to reveal what the patient 
values. 
Once the ethicist begins getting a 
sense of these values, she can ask, 
“What if you could no longer do these 
things?” This question will begin to 
show how the patient prioritizes these 
values. Once the ethicist discovers 
this priority, she will be able to begin 
constructing an image of the kinds 
of actions and values that comprise 
the patient’s world—an essential step 
in understanding the worldview of 
the patient and the kind of life she 
was leading. Gradually, a portrait 
of a meaningful world may begin to 
emerge. 
To conclude, it is my hope that 
this discussion of empathy—both its 
theoretical and practical sides—has 
helped clarify the concept and the 
practice. We see why it is essential 
and challenging: empathy means 
becoming invested in the lives 
of others while also questioning 
ourselves and setting aside our own 
beliefs. More than merely revealing 
treatment preferences, empathy 
requires that medical professionals 
encounter patients as people whose 
lives extend beyond the confines of 
the hospital room. 
Trevor M. Bibler, Ph.D., M.T.S.
Assistant Professor of Medicine
Center for Medical Ethics 
& Health Policy
Baylor College of Medicine
Cont. from page 5
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CASE PRESENTATION
CASE STUDY – ORAL SUPPLEMENTS AGAINST MEDICAL ADVICE
Mrs. J has been a resident at a Maryland nursing home for the past three years. She is 78 years old, and was diagnosed 
with dementia six years ago. Her dementia is now in an advanced stage. She is completely dependent on others for 
activities of daily living, and receives nutrition through a PEG tube. Two physicians have certified that she lacks 
decisional capacity and is in an end-stage condition. Mrs. J has an advance directive stating that if she is in an end-stage 
or terminal condition, that she wants her life to be “prolonged as long as possible within the limits of generally accepted 
health-care standards.” Her husband is appointed as her health care agent.  Her Medical Orders for Life-Sustaining 
Treatment (MOLST) form indicates “Attempt CPR” (there are no orders on page 2). Mr. J believes that her deterioration 
is not caused by progressive dementia, but by a biochemical imbalance that he believes can be treated through vitamins 
and supplements, including oral colloidal silver, which he has obtained through an online purchase. Mrs. J had been 
hospitalized two months earlier for aspiration pneumonia and Mr. J believes the silver supplements will reduce the risk 
of this recurring. Mrs. J’s attending physician has told Mr. J that rather than protecting Mrs. J from pneumonia, giving 
her any supplements by mouth increases her risk of developing another pneumonia. In addition, colloidal silver can’t be 
given through Mrs. J’s PEG tube because this would have to be written as a medical order and the physician won’t write 
an order for a supplement that can’t be obtained from the facility’s pharmacy and that doesn’t have data supporting its 
safety/purity. 
Staff have reported that Mr. J has a volatile temper, which is typically directed toward them in the form of yelling and 
name-calling. They observe his behavior toward Mrs. J as generally supportive. While she is not verbally communicative, 
staff report that Mrs. J responds positively to her husband’s presence (for example, exhibiting less agitated behaviors 
when he is in the room). Mr. J tells staff “I can do whatever I want, she is my wife!” and insists on continuing the silver 
and other supplements, which he provides to her through a dropper by mouth. Thus, staff are uncertain what to do: they 
feel obligated to protect Mrs. J from harm caused by developing another aspiration pneumonia, but don’t feel comfortable 
giving supplements of unknown quality/safety through her PEG tube. The nursing home administrator is considering 
banning Mr. J from visiting, or involuntarily discharging Mrs. J. An ethics consultation is requested to help resolve this 
dilemma.
RESPONSE FROM SINAI 
HOSPITAL ETHICS 
COMMITTEE MEMBERS
FACT ANALYSIS
It has been said that “good 
ethics begins with good facts” 
(Mackiewicz, 2016). The 
pertinent medical facts in Mrs. 
J’s case are as follows: she is 
78 years old with advanced 
dementia, progressive over the 
past six years. She now lacks 
decisional capacity and has a 
poor prognosis, deemed end-stage 
by two physicians. An “end-stage 
condition” is defined in the Maryland 
Health Care Decisions Act (HCDA) as 
“an advanced, progressive, irreversible 
condition caused by injury, disease, 
or illness that has caused severe and 
permanent deterioration indicated by 
incompetency and complete physical 
dependency, and for which, to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty, 
treatment of the irreversible condition 
would be medically ineffective” 
(Maryland HCDA).
Mrs. J. was recently hospitalized 
for aspiration pneumonia and has no 
other significant medical problems. 
She resides in a nursing home, is non-
ambulatory, is fed through a PEG tube 
and is dependent on others for all her 
activities of daily life.
Mrs. J has a valid advance directive 
which specifies that if she is in an 
end-stage or terminal condition, she 
wants her life to be prolonged “as 
long as possible within the limits 
of generally accepted health-care 
standards.” Her husband, Mr. J, has 
been designated as her health care 
agent. She also completed a MOLST 
form checking the box stating she 
wants CPR attempted; she gave no 
One of the regular features of this Newsletter is the presentation of a case considered by an ethics committee and an 
analysis of the ethical issues involved. Readers are both encouraged to comment on the case or analysis and to submit 
other cases that their ethics committee has dealt with. In all cases, identifying information about patients and others in the 
case should only be provided with the permission of the patient. Unless otherwise indicated, our policy is not to identify 
the submitter or institution. We may also change facts to protect confidentiality. Cases and comments should be sent to  
MHECN@law.umaryland.edu, or MHECN, Law & Health Care Program, University of Maryland Francis King Carey 
School of Law, 500 W. Baltimore St., Baltimore, MD 21201.
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other instructions.
Mr. J believes Mrs. J’s mental 
deterioration is caused by a 
biochemical imbalance which could 
be ameliorated by over-the-counter 
supplements – vitamins and oral 
colloidal silver (OCS). Her physician 
will not prescribe OCS because it 
is not an FDA-approved drug and 
cannot be obtained from the nursing 
home’s pharmacy. The facility’s 
staff will not administer it through 
her PEG tube because of safety and 
efficacy concerns and is reluctant 
to allow it to be given orally due 
to concern for causing aspiration 
pneumonia. As a result, Mr. J has 
been administering OCS, purchased 
legally on-line, to her by mouth 
through a dropper.
Mrs. J’s quality of life is quite 
limited. It is noted that she appears to 
respond favorably to her husband’s 
presence and actions by exhibiting 
less agitated behaviors when he is 
in the room, but no other effects, 
favorable or not, are described. 
Ethical Analysis
The facts in this case contrast with 
those in the more common scenario 
involving the withholding of food, 
water and other medical care from 
a patient with end-stage dementia. 
Here, the patient’s designated agent, 
her husband, Mr. J, seeks to continue 
providing an intervention that the 
treating team members believe 
is neither safe nor effective. It is 
central to our analysis that Mrs. J. 
has selected her husband as her 
health care agent under her advance 
directive, as this evidences her trust 
in him and gives him legal authority 
to make decisions for her.
The ethical issues revolve around 
several considerations. The first is 
related to Mrs. J’s physician’s refusal 
to prescribe OCS to her as requested 
by Mr. J. 
OCS is considered a dietary 
supplement. The U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration regulates 
such products under the Dietary 
Supplement Health and Education 
Act of 1994 (DSHEA), using a 
different set of standards from those 
applied to conventional foods, drugs 
and devices. So long as the product is 
not adulterated or misbranded and the 
manufacturer makes no therapeutic 
claims or misrepresentation about 
the efficacy of the product, it may be 
legally sold. 
According to the National Institutes 
of Health, OCS administered orally 
has no accepted medical indications 
and can cause “serious” side effects, 
including argyria, a permanent 
discoloration of the skin due to 
deposition of silver in the tissues. 
“Excessive doses” of the substance 
have also been reported to cause 
kidney and neurologic disorders 
as well as to negatively interact 
with certain medicines, none of 
which Mrs. J is currently taking. 
While anecdotal testimonials, many 
described on the Internet, favorably 
view the use of OCS for a number 
of conditions, including pneumonia, 
OCS is not a generally accepted 
standard health care treatment.
Following the principle of 
beneficence, the physician and 
treating staff have no ethical 
obligation to provide this modality to 
Mrs. J. Furthermore, the principle of 
non-maleficence requires that patient 
harm must be avoided. On that basis, 
even though the potential of OCS to 
cause harm is limited, it adds ethical 
justification to withhold it from the 
patient.
A second consideration is whether 
the use of OCS is absolutely 
prohibited because it is not 
considered safe and effective under 
the “generally accepted health care 
standards” rubric. The objections of 
the physician and nurses caring for 
Mrs. J are based on concerns that 
aspiration of orally administered 
substances pose a potential for harm. 
There is no indication of any such 
complications related to Mr. J’s 
giving her the OCS by dropper, but 
we do know she was hospitalized for 
aspiration pneumonia in the recent 
past. 
Current knowledge of the 
pathophysiology of aspiration 
identifies dysphagia, dementia, and 
especially PEG tube feedings as 
important risk factors, and, when 
pneumonia occurs, it is primarily 
related to aspiration of bacteria in 
oropharyngeal secretions. Small 
amounts of OCS orally via dropper 
should not cause significant lung 
problems, even if it were to be 
aspirated, especially given the fact 
that OCS is sometimes administered 
without incident by inhalation 
intended to reach the lungs.
A third consideration relates to 
claims of or liability for abuse if 
Mrs. J suffers harm from the OCS 
or its administration. Maryland law 
does not address the administration 
of dietary supplements to patients in 
health care institutions, so they are 
free to establish policies they believe 
to serve the patients’ best interests. 
Liability claims resulting from bad 
outcomes or harm are always possible 
when patients or their families are at 
odds with clinicians over a patient’s 
care, and end-of-life decisions may be 
particularly fraught with such.
In each case, the risks and 
benefits of each care option should 
be evaluated in the context of the 
impact on the patient’s quality of 
life. If the patient or decision-maker 
chooses to act contrary to a clinician’s 
recommendation, discussion among 
the parties should take place to 
make sure the risks and benefits are 
understood. These conversations 
should be documented in the medical 
record.  Signing of releases from 
liability are viewed by many in the 
legal community as neither helpful 
nor enforceable. 
Recommendation
In light of Mrs. J’s end-stage 
condition and the minimal risks 
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associated with OCS, it is ethical to 
allow its administration to Mrs. J 
via the PEG tube, honoring Mr. J’s 
wishes. 
The situation has led to conflict 
and mistrust between Mr. J and 
the nursing home staff. As it is not 
clear that effective communication 
between the parties has occurred, 
an ethics consultation team should 
meet with all parties. The team 
should review the medical facts, 
as well as stakeholders’ values and 
preferences, and where appropriate, 
seek compromise.  Educating the 
staff about causes of aspiration and 
the likely few, if any, adverse effects 
caused by the OCS may persuade the 
medical team that supplemental OCS 
administered via Mrs. J’s PEG tube is 
both reasonable and acceptable. If the 
treating team remains unwilling, Mr. J 
should be permitted to administer the 
OCS to Mrs. J in the least intrusive 
and most convenient manner.  As a 
last resort, if compromise cannot be 
reached, the physician and nursing 
home should assist Mr. and Mrs. J 
in finding alternative arrangements 
where her husband’s actions on her 
behalf will be accommodated.
David L Meyers, MD FACEP
Former Chair, Division of 
Emergency Medicine
Member, Sinai Hospital 
Ethics Committee 
Jeffrey Brauer, MD
Division of Pulmonary & 
Critical Care Medicine
Member, Sinai Hospital 
Ethics Committee 
Yoram Unguru, MD, MS, MA
Division of Pediatric 
Hematology/Oncology
The Herman and Walter Samuelson 
Children's Hospital at Sinai
Chair, Sinai Hospital 
Ethics Committee
Berman Institute of Bioethics, 
Johns Hopkins University
THANKS TO:  Darlene A. Skinner, 
R.N., M.S.N., J.D., CPHRM
Director, Enterprise Risk 
and Insurance
Member, Ethics Committee
Sinai Hospital
Alan Eason, JD
Member, Ethics Committee
Sinai Hospital
REFERENCES
Mackiewicz, B.N.S. (2016). Good 
ethics begins with good facts. 
American Journal of Bioethics, 16(7), 
66-68. 
Maryland Health Care Decisions Act, 
§5–601(j)(1)((2). Available at http://
www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/
Pages/HealthPolicy/hcda.aspx.
Dietary Supplement Health and 
Education Act of 1994; https://ods.
od.nih.gov/About/DSHEA_Wording.
aspx#sec4.
National Center for Complementary 
and Integrative Health; https://nccih.
nih.gov/health/silver; accessed 
10/30/2017.
COMMENTS FROM AN 
ETHICS CONSULTANT
Ethical conflicts in long-term 
care facilities often play out over a 
protracted period, raising questions 
unique to those settings. Providing 
“patient/family-centered care” 
involves balancing tensions between 
respecting a resident’s autonomy 
and promoting the resident’s well-
being and safety—in addition to 
meeting federal and state nursing 
home regulations and ensuring a 
safe environment for staff and other 
residents. Based on the case summary 
as written, Mrs. J appears to be in the 
late stages of dementia (this should 
be confirmed). Given that her living 
will indicates a preference to receive 
life-prolonging interventions “as 
long as possible within the limits 
of generally accepted health-care 
standards,” it is appropriate that she is 
receiving feedings through a feeding 
(PEG) tube and that her resuscitation 
status is “Attempt CPR,” although 
this should be revisited as her illness 
progresses. While some individuals 
opt to focus more on comfort at the 
end of a chronic fatal illness like 
progressive dementia, it appears the 
goals of care for Mrs. J are to prolong 
her life. Ideally, she should be kept 
as comfortable as possible while 
pursuing this goal, and information 
about her life narrative would be 
elicited to put these important end-of-
life decisions into more context. 
One concern raised in this case 
is whether staff should allow Mr. J 
to administer oral supplements of 
unknown safety that may increase 
Mrs. J’s risk of developing aspiration 
pneumonia, or whether staff should 
administer these supplements through 
Mrs. J’s feeding tube. Given that 
Mrs. J is at risk for aspirating and that 
she has recently been hospitalized 
for aspiration pneumonia, it seems 
appropriate that the medical team 
recommends against administering 
any medication or supplement 
orally. The dilemma here is that to 
provide the supplements by PEG 
tube, a medical order would have 
to be written, and in this case, the 
supplement that Mr. J wants his wife 
to get is likely not available in the 
nursing facility’s pharmacy, nor is it 
a treatment the facility’s clinicians 
would consider “standard medical 
care.” 
Given the rise in popularity of 
“alternative” treatments that can be 
acquired over the counter (or in this 
case, purchased on the internet), 
questions arise about the safety of 
these products, which are not subject 
to the same regulatory oversight as 
drugs approved by the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA). 
Mr. J is convinced that colloidal 
silver is benefitting his wife and 
should be continued. Palliative care 
practitioners recognize that at times, 
interventions benefit a patient’s 
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loved ones as much (or more) than 
the patient him/herself. Could staff 
allow Mr. J to continue giving the 
supplement to Mrs. J based on 
this rationale? That is, even if the 
colloidal silver wasn’t actually 
helping her, if it didn’t harm her, and 
gave Mr. J a sense of control and 
belief that he was helping her, could 
this justify allowing him to continue 
giving it? Such a decision requires 
considering potential harms. Setting 
aside the concern about aspiration if 
the supplement was given by mouth, 
could the colloidal silver harm Mrs. 
J?
Hadrup and Lam (2014) categorize 
silver as “non-essential to human 
physiology,” although humans are 
exposed through contact with silver 
coins, tableware, jewelry, dental 
fillings, and fish consumption. Mr. 
J’s confidence that silver will protect 
his wife from contracting pneumonia 
is likely informed by information 
presented on websites and other 
sources touting silver as an anti-
bacterial and anti-inflammatory agent. 
While it is true that silver compounds 
are used topically to treat wounds, 
there is no evidence that ingesting 
silver can treat or prevent systemic 
infections. Negative effects have been 
seen in animal studies at higher doses 
(for example, hypoactivity, altered 
blood values, enlarged heart, and 
immunological effects).  It could also 
interfere with how other medications 
are absorbed. Hadrup and Lam 
calculated a “tolerable daily intake” 
of 2.5 micrograms per kilogram per 
day. Perhaps the fact that no skin 
discoloration is noted provides some 
evidence that Mrs. J has not received 
toxic doses, since excessive silver 
exposure manifests through a blue-
grey skin discoloration. However, 
from this review, it appears that 
ingesting colloidal silver presents 
more potential harm than benefit.
This information appears to 
support the clinicians’ decision not 
to order colloidal silver for staff to 
administer. But what about taking 
action to prevent Mr. J from giving 
it to his wife on his own? Allowing 
him to do this “on record” would 
likely be prohibited by the Code of 
Maryland Regulations for long-term 
care facilities. But what if he gives it 
when staff are not in the room? What 
should staff do if they suspect this? If 
Mr. J were caring for Mrs. J in their 
own home, he could very well give 
her over-the-counter supplements 
without the knowledge or approval 
of the health care team. Would a 
health care provider raise concerns 
about negligent care or elder abuse in 
such a situation? This question could 
provide a threshold for considering 
how much staff should oppose Mr. 
J’s actions in dosing his wife with 
the supplement. Since the current 
goal of care is to prolong Mrs. J’s 
life, including attempting CPR if 
needed and treating her aggressively 
if she developed pneumonia, it 
seems appropriate that the clinicians 
recommend against her getting 
anything orally. Thus, if Mr. J was 
found to be dosing his wife by mouth, 
that might warrant more active 
opposition from staff. While a risk 
of aspiration from comfort feedings 
might be allowed if the goal of care 
were to maximize her pleasure and 
quality of life, since the colloidal 
silver isn’t intended to increase Mrs. 
J’s comfort or pleasure, but merely 
to appease Mr. J in his belief that it’s 
providing her benefit, there’s less 
justification for not opposing his 
actions here. Also, if he were dosing 
through the feeding tube, this might 
have implications for how facility 
staff manage and oversee her care. 
The clinical team should explain 
their reasoning to Mr. J for omitting 
the colloidal silver from Mrs. J’s plan 
of care in a way that he is best able to 
understand. Perhaps other alternative/
complementary interventions could 
be explored for Mrs. J that Mr. J 
might find meaningful, such as 
aromatherapy or music therapy. How 
should staff proceed if they suspect 
Mr. J is giving the colloidal silver to 
Mrs. J by mouth despite being told 
not to do this? Given the depiction 
of Mr. J has having a volatile temper, 
“policing” or directly confronting 
him is ill-advised. Mrs. J appears 
comforted by her husband’s presence, 
so banning him from her bedside 
would deprive her of this (and 
would be logistically challenging to 
implement). Ultimately, the clinicians 
have to evaluate the degree of actual 
harm they think Mrs. J is exposed to. 
If they conclude that Mr. J’s actions 
are too great a threat to Mrs. J, or to 
others in the facility if he is unable 
to control his anger, options include 
involving Adult Protective Services, 
seeking guardianship for Mrs. J to 
replace Mr. J as his wife’s health care 
agent, or pursuing an involuntary 
discharge of Mrs. J based on inability 
of the facility to meet her welfare 
and needs, or concern that the health 
of individuals in the facility are 
endangered by her continued stay 
(MD Code Health-General §19-
345). Ideally, the process of ethics 
consultation would uncover a less 
drastic resolution to this situation. 
For example, a behavioral contract 
could be negotiated between Mr. J 
and staff to establish expectations 
of their interactions. Sometimes 
the “difficult” family member is 
simply one who has not felt heard, 
understood, or respected. Other 
times, family members cross lines 
despite best efforts of staff to work 
with them to do what’s best for the 
patient. All the stakeholders in this 
case deserve consideration of what’s 
best for Mrs. J and what reasonable 
accommodations look like in meeting 
her goals of care. 
Anita J. Tarzian, PhD, RN
MHECN Program Coordinator
Ethics & Research Consultant
Baltimore, MD
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JANUARY
22 (4-5:30PM)
Clinical Ethics Case Consultation Webinar: Tips and Pitfalls, 
sponsored by the Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy at 
Baylor College of Medicine. Visit: events.houstonmethodist.org/
webinar-bioethics. 
26 (10A-12N)
Meeting of the State Advisory Council on Quality Care at 
the End of Life, executive conference room at the Office 
of Health Care Quality in the Bland Bryant Building, 
Spring Grove Campus, Catonsville, MD. For campus map/
directions, visit: https://health.maryland.gov/ohcq/Documents/
MapofSpringGrove.jpeg. 
FEBRUARY
8-10
Conflict Resolution and Clinical-Setting Mediation for 
Healthcare, sponsored by the Center for Conflict Resolution 
in Healthcare, Memphis, TN. Visit: http://www.healthcare-
mediation.net/registration.html. 
28 – March 2
Carol Carfang Nursing & Healthcare Ethics Conference, 
sponsored by Duquesne University School of Nursing, 
Clearwater, FL. Visit: http://duq.edu/academics/schools/nursing/
carfang-conference. 
MARCH
1-4
Ethics and Error in Medicine. Annual Meeting of the 
Association for Practical and Professional Ethics. Chicago, IL. 
Visit: http://appe-ethics.org/. 
2
Pellegrino Seminar on the Philosophy of Medicine, Georgetown 
University, Washington, DC. Visit: http://www.cvent.com/d/
qtqkny/4W. 
APRIL
12-13
Fifty Years After the Harvard Report on Brain Death: 
Consensus, Controversy, and the Future of Organ 
Transplantation, sponsored by Harvard University, Boston, MA. 
Visit: http://bioethics.hms.harvard.edu/. 
13-14
Third Annual Reproductive Ethics Conference, sponsored by 
the Alden March Bioethics Institute & Department of Obstetrics 
& Gynecology, Albany Medical College, Albany, NY. Visit: 
https://www.amc.edu/academic/bioethics/reproductive_ethics/
reproductiveethicsconference.cfm.
13-15
Age and Longevity in the 21st Century: Science, Policy and 
Ethics, sponsored by the Global Bioethics Initiative, 
New York, NY. Visit: http://www.conferenceaging.
org. 
13-15
Examining the Foundations of Medicine and 
Religion, Union Station Hotel, St. Louis, MO. Visit: 
www.medicineandreligion.com. 
16-18
Intensive Bioethics Course, Houston, TX (see Jan 22 
event above for sponsorship and contact info).
 
RECURRING EVENTS
Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics 
Seminar Series, either at Sheik Zayed Tower Chevy 
Chase Conference Center (1800 Orleans St.) or 
Feinstone Hall, E2030, Bloomberg School of 
Public Health (615 N. Wolfe St.) Baltimore, MD. 
12N-1:15PM. Visit: http://www.bioethicsinstitute.
org/educationtraining-2/seminar-series.
January 22- Speaker: Eric Dishman, Director, All 
of U.S. Research Program on Precision Medicine 
(Zayed)
February 12- Speaker: Juan Mendez, JD, Professor 
of Human Rights Law In Residence, Washington 
College of Law (Feinstone Hall)
February 26- Speaker: Anne Barnhill, PhD, 
Assistant Professor, Medical Ethics and Health 
Policy, Perelman School of Medicine, University of 
Pennsylvania (Feinstone Hall)
March 12- Speaker: Christine Mitchell, MTS, MS, 
FAAN, Executive Director, Center for Bioethics, 
Harvard Medical School (Hutzler-Rives Memorial 
Lecture; Zayed)
March 26- Speaker: Hilde Lindemann, PhD, MA, 
Professor of Philosophy, Michigan State University 
(Feinstone Hall)
April 9- Speaker: David DeGrazia, PhD, M.Stud, 
Professor of Philosophy, George Washington 
University & Senior Research Fellow, Department 
of Bioethics, National Institutes of Health (Feinstone 
Hall)
April 23- Speaker: Kathleen Meert, MD, FCCM, 
Chief, Division of Critical Care Medicine, Professor, 
Department of Pediatrics, Children’s Hospital of 
Michigan (Hutzler-Rives Memorial Lecture; Zayed)
CALENDAR OF EVENTS 
Winter 2018
The Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee Network (MHECN) is a membership organization, established by the Law and 
Health Care Program at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The purpose of MHECN is to facilitate 
and enhance ethical reflection in all aspects of decision making in health care settings by supporting and providing informational 
and educational resources to ethics committees serving health care institutions in the state of Maryland. The Network attempts to 
achieve this goal by:
• Serving as a resource to ethics committees as they investigate ethical dilemmas within their institution and as they strive to 
assist their institution act consistently with its mission statement;
• Fostering communication and information sharing among Network members;
• Providing educational programs for ethics committee members, other healthcare providers, and members of the general 
public on ethical issues in health care; and
• Conducting research to improve the functioning of ethics committees and ultimately the care of patients in Maryland.
MHECN appreciates the support of its individual and institutional members. MHECN also welcomes support from affiliate 
members who provide additional financial support.
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